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Complete Abstract: 
In automated negotiation systems consisting of self-interested agents, contracts have traditionally been 
binding. Leveled commitment contracts - i.e. contracts where each party can decommit by paying a 
predetermined penalty - were recently shown to improve Pareto efficiency even if agents rationally 
decommit in Nash equilibrium using inflated thresholds on how good their outside offers must be before 
they decommit. This paper operationalizes the four leveled commitment contracting protocols by 
presenting algorithms for using them. Algorithms are presented for computing the Nash equilibrium 
decomitting thresholds and decommitting probabilities given the contract price and the penalties. 
Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium are analyzed. Algorithms are also presented for optimizing 
the contract itself (price and penalties). Existence and uniqueness of the optimum are analyzed. Using the 
algorithms we offer a contract optimization service on the web as part of eMediator, our next generation 
electronic commerce server. Finally, the algorithms are generalized to contracts involving more than two 
agents. 




















